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LIFE AFTER ACT 10?: IS THERE A
FUTURE FOR COLLECTIVE
REPRESENTATION OF WISCONSIN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES?
MARTIN H. MALIN

*

In 2011, Wisconsin largely gutted the collective bargaining rights of
most public employees in the state. Wisconsin Act 10 largely replaced
collective employee voice with unilateral employer control over
employees’ wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. This
article addresses the future of collective employee representation in
Wisconsin in the wake of Act 10. It urges employers to continue to
engage with their employees through the employees’ unions,
demonstrating why such an approach better provides for the public
interest than unilateral employer control. It looks to examples from other
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments
from Peter Davis, Tim Hawks, Kurt Kobelt, and Paul Secunda. I also acknowledge financial
support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: As this issue of the Marquette Law Review was in press, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision in Wisconsin Education Ass’n
Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Nos. 121854, 12-2011 & 12-2058 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2013), which held that the disparate scope of
bargaining for general and public safety employees was constitutional. It reversed, however,
the district court’s holding that the disparate treatment concerning recertification elections
and dues check-off was unconstitutional. With respect to dues check-off, the court divided
two-to-one. The majority did not dispute the facts as found by the district court, but held that
as a matter of law the facts did not establish unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The
majority noted, for example, that the category of public safety employees included municipal
police and firefighter bargaining units represented by unions that had endorsed Governor
Walker’s opponent, Wisconsin Education Ass’n Council, Nos. 12-1854, 12-2011 & 12-2058,
slip op. at 22, discounted a statement by Senate Majority Leader Fitzgerald that, if enacted,
the bill would deny funds to President Obama’s reelection campaign as not necessarily
reflective of the intentions of the legislature as a whole, id., slip op. at 25, and characterized
dues check-off as a governmental subsidy of speech, opining that governments may
discriminate when they subsidize speech, id., slip op. at 10–13. The Seventh Circuit’s decision
makes the suggestion in this Article, that employers allow employees to perform
representation functions on official time, even more important.
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jurisdictions and presents a range of alternatives for Wisconsin public
employers and unions to provide for meaningful employee voice.
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INTRODUCTION

Republican victories in the 2010 elections led to a dramatic upheaval
in the law governing public employee collective bargaining in numerous
1
states. Nowhere was this upheaval more dramatic than in Wisconsin,
where Act 10 eliminated most collective bargaining rights for most
Wisconsin public employees, eliminated all collective bargaining rights
for some Wisconsin public employees, and left a small group of public
employees largely untouched. The change in the law was particularly
poignant because Wisconsin was the first state in the country to enact a
2
comprehensive public employee collective bargaining statute.
Act 10 greatly increased public employers’ power in dealing with
their workforces. One might expect that public officials would
uniformly welcome such enhanced power. This was not the case.
During the debates over Act 10, numerous public officials opposed its
3
enactment. As these public officials undoubtedly recognized, positive
involvement by workers through a union designated or selected by a
4
majority of the workforce adds value to the public enterprise. Worker
voice and the positive contributions workers make to effective public
service need not be a casualty of Act 10.
Accordingly, this Article’s focus is on what avenues for collective
representation of public employees in Wisconsin remain after Act 10.
Although Wisconsin public employers now have the legal ability to
exercise unilateral control over the terms and conditions of employment
for most of their employees, this Article urges that they continue to
engage with their workers through their workers’ representatives and
looks to other jurisdictions to provide examples of how such
engagement might occur. Part II provides background to Act 10 and
reviews the statute and its impact on public employee collective
bargaining. Part III details why we should be concerned with the
survival of public employee collective representation after Act 10. It
contrasts unilateral managerial imposition, which breeds hostility and
resistance, with worker involvement, which leads to creative problem
1. See generally Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public-Sector Labor Law:
A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149 (2012) (discussing changes
in public employee collective bargaining statutes in more than twelve states following the
2010 elections).
2. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE
LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900–1962, at 158, 183–84 (2004).
3. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part III.
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solving and increased productivity. Part IV provides options for
collective representation of public employees in light of the restrictions
imposed by Act 10. Looking to the experience in other jurisdictions,
particularly Tennessee where the law is clear that public employers lack
authority to bargain collectively in the absence of state statutory
authorization, Part IV discusses the following options: bargaining in
spite of the legal prohibition, bargaining with unions with the resulting
agreements only covering union members, bargaining with unions over
frameworks that will facilitate union representation of their members,
meet and confer sessions with unions representing the employer’s
workers and collaborative conferencing. Part IV also discusses union
financial viability in the current hostile legal environment in Wisconsin.
Part V concludes by suggesting that there may be a silver lining in Act
10’s gray cloud. Freed from the constraints of the pre-Act 10 legal
structure, public employers and the unions that represent their
employees can create their own structures for providing worker voice in
ways that add value to the public enterprise.
II. ACT 10: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
A. Background to Act 10
The developments leading up to the enactment of Act 10 and the
fallout from its enactment were particularly dramatic. On February 15,
2011, a “budget repair bill” that was the forerunner of Act 10 was
introduced by the Assembly’s Committee on Assembly Organization at
5
the request of newly-elected-Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker. The
proposed radical change to Wisconsin public sector collective bargaining
law led to demonstrations of a magnitude not seen in Madison since the
6
Vietnam War. Because the bill involved fiscal matters, a quorum of
7
60% of the State Senate was needed to take action. Taking advantage
of this requirement, every Democratic senator left the state to deny the
8
Republican majority the quorum. In response to the Democrats leaving
the state and blocking the quorum, Republicans then stripped all fiscal
5. See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 21, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d
436 (Prosser, J., concurring).
6. See Bill Glauber & Don Walker, Protesters Deriding Bill Again Fill Capitol Square,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 WLNR 3854294.
7. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 21, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436; see WIS. CONST.
art. VIII, § 8.
8. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 26, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436.
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provisions which required the super-majority quorum from the
9
measure. On March 9, 2011, with the Democrats still absent, the
10
Republicans called for a conference committee meeting at 6:00 p.m.
At that meeting, they adopted the stripped-down bill as an
11
unamendable conference committee report. The State Senate passed
the revised bill that same day and the Assembly adopted it the following
12
13
day. On March 11, 2011, Governor Walker signed Act 10.
The signing of Act 10 did not end the drama. The Dane County
District Attorney sued contending that the Legislature violated the
Wisconsin open meetings law by not giving at least 24 hours’ notice of
the conference committee meeting, and the Dane County Circuit Court
14
agreed and enjoined publication of the act. However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, by a party-line four-to-three vote, granted the state’s
petition for supervisory/original jurisdiction, held that the circuit court
violated the State Constitution by enjoining the legislature, and held
that the legislature’s interpretation of the open meetings law as applied
15
to the legislature’s own actions was not subject to judicial review. The
court, thus, vacated the injunction, held that the legislature had not
16
violated the open access law, and allowed Act 10 to take effect.
17
The controversy spawned two rounds of recall elections. In the
summer of 2011, nine state senators—six Republicans and three
Democrats—were recalled, that is, required to stand for another
18
19
election to continue in office. Two of the Republicans were defeated.
In 2012, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and four additional
20
Republican senators were recalled. In 2012, all incumbents, except for
9. Id. ¶ 28.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 29.
13. Id.
14. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, No. 11-CV-1244 at 2 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County
May 26, 2011); Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶ 1, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436.
15. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, ¶¶ 5, 7–9, 13, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436.
16. Id. ¶¶ 6, 11.
17. Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 301–02 (2012). Under Wisconsin law, incumbents may be recalled only
after they have been in office for at least one year since their most recent election. Id. at 301.
18. Id.
19. See id. (explaining that four of the targeted Republicans and all three targeted
Democrats remained in office after the recall).
20. Id. at 302 n.42.
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one senator, won their recall elections, but the change in one Senate seat
21
gave the Democrats a majority in that body.
The drama continues in federal and state court. In Wisconsin
22
Education Ass’n Council v. Walker, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of Act 10’s
provision prohibiting bargaining over anything other than increases in
base wages, but held that Act 10’s prohibition on payment of union dues
by payroll deduction and the requirement that exclusive bargaining
representatives submit to annual recertification elections were
23
unconstitutional. The decision was not flattering to Governor Walker.
Act 10 does not apply to those workers it characterizes as “public safety
employees,” and the constitutional issues before the court focused on
24
whether this exclusion denied the other employees equal protection.
The court observed that the definition of public safety employees was
gerrymandered to protect only those unions that had endorsed
Governor Walker in the 2010 election, while subjecting those unions
who had endorsed Walker’s opponent—including unions of some law
enforcement and firefighting employees—to the extreme limitations of
25
Act 10. The latter group—those subject to the limitations of Act 10—
included Wisconsin Capitol Police, the University of Wisconsin Campus
Police, state correctional officers, probation and parole officers,
conservation wardens, fire crash rescue specialists, and state criminal
26
investigation agents. The court found that Act 10’s distinction between
general and public safety employees for purposes of allowing or
prohibiting dues check-off lacked any rational basis and, therefore,
27
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

21. See Alison Bauter, Recount Affirms Lehman’s Win in Senate Recall Race,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 2, 2012, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/recountaffirms-lehmans-win-in-senate-recall-race-905vroh-161095435.html (explaining the recount in
Senate candidate Lehman’s recall that declared Lehman the winner and gave state
Democrats a majority); Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Senate Dems May Have Majority,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 7, 2012, at 1A (noting that Republicans were declared
winners in three of the four Senate recall elections).
22. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012), appeal
filed, 12-CV-2011 (7th Cir. 2012).
23. Id. at 859–60.
24. Id. at 866–70.
25. Id. at 863, 867, 873.
26. Id. at 864–65.
27. Id. at 875–77.
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The court also found that it violated the First Amendment. The court
distinguished Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n, where the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Idaho’s prohibition on any check29
off of monies to be used for political purposes, on the ground that the
Wisconsin enactment did not apply across the board but instead
30
discriminated on the basis of speaker viewpoint.
The fact that none of the public employee unions falling into
the general category endorsed Walker in the 2010 election and
that all of the unions that endorsed Walker fall within the public
safety category certainly suggests that unions representing
general employees have different viewpoints than those of the
unions representing public safety employees.
Moreover,
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the evidence of record
strongly suggests that the exemption of those unions from Act
10’s prohibition on automatic dues deductions enhances the
ability of unions representing public safety employees to
31
continue to support this Governor and his party.
With similar reasoning, the court held that subjecting unions
representing non-public safety employees to annual recertification
elections while exempting unions representing public safety employees,
as defined in Act 10, lacked a rational basis and was an unconstitutional
32
denial of equal protection. However, with respect to the disparate
permissible scope of bargaining, the court found no unconstitutional
33
denial of equal protection. Nevertheless, the court remarked on the
apparent political motives behind Act 10:
While the court concludes that the carving out of public
safety employees under the Act is rationally-related to a
legitimate government interest in avoiding disruptions by those
employees, at least facially, it cannot wholly discount evidence
that the line-drawing between public safety employees and
general employees was influenced (or perhaps even dictated) by
whether the unions representing these employees supported
Governor Walker’s gubernatorial campaign.
The Act’s
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 870, 875–77.
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009).
Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 872–73.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 868.
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treatment of the Capital Police, who endorsed the Governor’s
opponent, in comparison to its treatment of state vehicle
inspectors, who endorsed the Governor, best illustrates this
34
suspect line-drawing.
To the court, however, “political favoritism is no grounds for
35
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause.”
Consequently, the court found that the disparate scope of bargaining
36
survived rational basis scrutiny.
37
In Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, the Circuit Court for Dane
County held that Act 10’s provisions prohibiting bargaining over all
matters except base wages, restricting increases in base wages to
increases in the cost of living unless approved in a public referendum,
prohibiting dues check-off and fair share fees and mandating annual
recertification elections, as applied to local government employees,
38
violated the U.S. and Wisconsin State Constitutions.
The court
reasoned that Act 10 treated employees who choose to associate with a
labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining differently
from other employees and treated labor organizations differently with
39
respect to payroll deductions from all other organizations. The court
further reasoned that Act 10’s prohibition on employers paying the
employees’ shares of pension contributions violated the City of
40
Milwaukee’s “Home Rule” authority.
As of this writing, both the
41
federal and state cases are on appeal, and so the drama continues.
B. Overview of Act 10
Act 10 effectuated a radical overhaul of Wisconsin public sector
labor relations law. The Act completely stripped collective bargaining
rights away from state university faculty, all employees of the University
of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics, and day care and home health care

34. Id. at 867.
35. Id. at 868.
36. Id.
37. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, No. 11-CV-3774 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County Sept.
14, 2012), appeal filed, (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2012).
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 17–19.
40. Id. at 22.
41. Id.; Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012),
appeal filed, 12-CV-2011 (7th Cir. 2012).
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42

providers.
As discussed above, it divided the remaining public
employees into two groups: public safety employees and general
43
employees. Public safety employees were exempt from the changes
44
The regular biannual budget act added an
enacted in Act 10.
exemption for municipal transit employees if denial of collective
bargaining rights to those transit employees will result in a denial of
45
federal funds.
With respect to general employees, Act 10 prohibits bargaining over
all subjects except “base wages,” which expressly excludes overtime,
premium pay, merit pay, performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay
46
progressions. Base wages may not increase more than the increase in
the Consumer Price Index as of 180 days before the expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement unless authority is obtained through a
47
voter referendum.
Act 10 also did away with interest arbitration for all general
48
employees.
Consequently, even the permitted bargaining over
increases in base wages has no end point. With no right to strike or to
compel their employer to arbitrate impasses in negotiations, Act 10
leaves general public employees with very little bargaining power.
Act 10 also requires incumbent exclusive bargaining representatives
to submit to annual recertification elections to maintain their status as
49
exclusive representative.
In these elections, the representative is
decertified unless it receives votes equal to at least 51% of the
50
employees in the bargaining unit. Thus, any employee who does not
vote is counted as a vote against retaining the existing bargaining
51
representative. A favorable vote from a majority of employees who
vote is insufficient; the union must obtain votes from 51% of employees
52
in the bargaining unit. Indeed, in at least one instance, an incumbent

42.
43.
44.
45.

2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 265, 279–80.
Id. § 219.
Id.
WIS. DEP’T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF POLICY, BUDGET & FIN., 2011–13 BIENNIAL
BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS: 2011 WISCONSIN ACT 32, at 7; see 2011 Wis. Act 32.
46. 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 314.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 237.
49. Id. § 289.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.

12 MALIN (DO NOT DELETE)

632

3/6/2013 9:30 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:623

union faced decertification when it received the votes of more than 50%
53
but less than 51% of the employees in the unit. Such a requirement is
unprecedented.
Act 10 also took aim at union treasuries. It prohibits assessment of
fair share fees against employees in the bargaining unit who choose not
54
to join the union and thereby save the cost of union dues. Fair share
fees are common provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Under
fair share arrangements, unions may not require employees who are in
the bargaining unit but are not members of the union to pay dues, but
they may require them to pay their pro rata share of the costs of
55
representation. In other words, fair share fees generally amount to
dues minus the percentage of dues spent on political and ideological
activity not directly related to collective bargaining and representation.
Requiring non-members of the union to pay fair share fees
recognizes that absent such a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement, many workers who desire union representation will make
the economically rational decision not to join the union and pay dues.
This is because improved wages and working conditions, and most other
goals sought by a union are, with respect to the workers it represents,
collective goods. They cannot be withheld from workers in the
bargaining unit who choose not to join the union. Absent a union
security agreement requiring those who choose not to join to pay a
service fee, economically rational workers will not join the union
because each worker will not perceive his or her membership alone as
strengthening the union and all workers will receive the benefits the
56
union achieves regardless of whether they join and pay dues.
As discussed previously, Act 10 also prohibits employers from
honoring voluntary requests by union members to pay their dues via

53. E-mail from Tim Hawks, Attorney, Hawks Quindel, S.C., to Paul Secunda, Assoc.
Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Mar. 13, 2012, 09:00 CST) (on file with author)
(discussing the support staff unit at the Elmbrook School District).
54. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 219, 276.
55. See generally Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (holding that the local union
could charge nonmembers a service fee that amounted to the ordinary costs for
representational activities); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (holding that
the union could charge members costs associated with state and national union affiliates);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that the agency shop provision of
the collective bargaining agreement that required non-union workers to pay a fee that
covered the costs of the union’s collective bargaining activities was valid).
56. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 76–91 (1965).
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57

payroll deduction. Such a prohibition can have a devastating effect on
a union’s ability to represent employees. An example from New York
illustrates these effects. New York’s Taylor Law prohibits strikes by
58
public employees in that state.
One penalty against a union for
59
engaging in an illegal strike is suspension of the union’s dues check-off.
When the United Federation of Teachers engaged in an illegal strike
against the New York City Public Schools from September 9 through
September 16, 1976, the New York Public Employment Relations Board
60
(NYPERB) suspended its dues check-off. Litigation over the penalty
61
delayed its imposition until May 1, 1982. In the first three months of
the suspension, the union’s revenue from dues and agency shop fees
dropped by $1.3 million, and when the cost of dues and fee collection
62
was considered, it had lost $2 million. Finding that the loss in income
impaired the union’s ability to provide necessary representational
63
services, the NYPERB restored the dues check-off.
Act 10 was clearly designed to replace collective representation of
public sector employees with unilateral employer control. Governor
Walker defended the wholesale dismantling of the existing legal regime
as necessary to give public employers “the tools to reward productive
workers and improve their operations. Most crucially, our reforms
confront the barriers of collective bargaining that currently block
64
innovation and reform.” The next section explains why the Governor
is sorely mistaken.
III. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT ACT 10?
If Governor Walker was correct that Wisconsin had to dismantle
collective representation of public employees to free employers from
barriers to innovation and reform, one would have expected nearly
unanimous support from Wisconsin public employers for the Governor’s

57. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
58. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(1) (Gould Supp. 2012).
59. Id. § 210(3).
60. United Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2, 15 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 3136, 3138 (1982).
61. Id. at 3137.
62. Id.
63. Id. For additional examples of the devastating effect loss of dues check-off can have
on union finances, see Ann C. Hodges, Maintaining Union Resources in an Era of Public
Sector Bargaining Retrenchment, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (forthcoming 2012).
64. Scott Walker, Op-Ed., Why I’m Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 10, 2011, at
A17.
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budget repair bill. Such was not the case. During the debates over the
Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, the Wisconsin Association of School
Boards reported that many of its member school boards were “gravely
concerned” that the bill would “immeasurably harm the collaborative
65
relationships that exist between school boards and teachers.”
Hundreds of local government officials signed an open letter to the
66
Governor opposing the bill on similar grounds.
Public employers had good reason to oppose Act 10. Unilaterallyimposed terms breed resistance while collaboratively developed policies
bring benefits to employees and the public. A prime example of this can
be seen in conflicting approaches to teacher evaluation and discipline.
The stereotype of teacher unions as defenders of the irremediably
incompetent who raise the costs of terminating a teacher to the point
where they make even the most nightmarish teacher fire-proof are
based on teacher union actions where performance standards are
developed and implemented unilaterally by management. In such
circumstances, we should not fault the union for performing the job into
which it has been channeled—protecting its members from
management-imposed action. However, in a significant number of
67
school districts, employers and unions have embraced peer review. In
such cases, management and union cooperatively develop and
68
implement performance standards.
Teachers are evaluated and
counseled by their peers—who are able to devote greater time than
principals who may be able to perform only a few observations per
69
teacher. Union involvement in setting and implementing standards of
teacher performance transforms the union into a defender of the
70
professional standards. Attrition rates for poor performing teachers
tend to be higher in districts embracing peer review than in districts that
71
follow the traditional unilateral command and control model.
65. Letter from John H. Ashley, Exec. Dir., Wis. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., to Hon. Alberta
Darling & Hon. Robin Vos, Co-chairs, Wis. Legislature Joint Comm. on Fin. (Feb. 15, 2011)
(copy on file with author).
66. See Erin Richards et al., Clash Continues: Many City Officials Think Union Limits
Go Too Far, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2011, at 1B.
67. See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective
Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
885, 904 (2007).
68. See id. at 905.
69. See id. at 905, 934.
70. See id. at 905.
71. See id. at 904–06.
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One of the most extensive efforts at expanded worker involvement
in workplace decision-making began in 1993 when President William
Jefferson Clinton issued Executive Order 12,871 which, among other
things, established a National Partnership Council and called for the
creation of labor-management partnerships throughout the executive
72
branch. Shortly before President George W. Bush took office, the
Heritage Foundation called on him to rescind Executive Order 12,871,
viewing the partnerships as an impediment to the new administration’s
73
ability to implement its policy agenda. Upon taking office, President
Bush obliged. On February 17, 2001, he revoked the Clinton executive
order and directed agency heads to “promptly move to rescind any
orders, rules, regulations, guidelines, or policies implementing or
74
enforcing Executive Order 12,871.”
President George W. Bush and Governor Walker appear to share a
vision of workplace efficiency in which employees robotically obey
commands that come down from above and are powerless to block
innovations and reforms dictated by management. The record under
the Clinton Executive Order, however, does not support this vision.
The scope of bargaining mandated by the Federal Service Labor
Management Relations Act, the statute which governs collective
bargaining between federal agencies and unions representing their
75
workers, is extremely narrow.
Successful partnerships under the
Clinton Executive Order did not confine themselves to topics on which
bargaining was legally required. They branched out into what the
National Partnership Council characterized as “non-traditional issues,”
including: reorganizations, quality issues, improvements in customer
service, re-engineering and streamlining work, impact of new
technology, reductions in force, budget and staffing levels, privatization,
76
and procurement.
Rather than impede workplace innovation and
efficiency, labor-management partnerships under the Clinton Executive
77
Order fostered it. Examples detailed in a report from the Office of

72. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1993).
73. Robert E. Moffit, George Nesterczuk & Donald J. Devine, Backgrounder No. 1404,
Taking Charge of Federal Personnel, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2001), http://www.heritage.
org/research/reports/2001/01/taking-charge-of-federal-personnel.
74. See Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2001).
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (2006).
76. NAT’L P’SHIP COUNCIL, OPM-NPC-09, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
PROGRESS IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS 19 (1997).
77. LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, U.S. OFF.
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Personnel Management at the end of President Clinton’s second term
include:


Partnering between the Internal Revenue Service and
National Treasury Employees Union to modernize and
restructure the IRS, resulting in measurable improvements in
78
customer service and job satisfaction.


Partnership between American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE) Local 3973 and Defense Contract
Management Command’s Raytheon Missile Systems facility
resulted in overwhelming improvement in customer service
ratings as workload increased 100% and the workforce
downsized, with $900,000 saved from the reduction in labor79
management litigation.
 The U.S. Mint and AFGE Mint Council engaged in joint
strategic planning, resulting in the U.S. Mint’s consistent ranking
near the top in the American Customer Satisfaction Index and its
production of record numbers of coins and return of record
80
profits to taxpayers.
 The Social Security Administration (SSA) and AFGE
partnership reengineered practices related to SSA’s toll free
number, resulting in SSA outscoring all other organizations for
800 number customer satisfaction in 1995, and in a 1999 customer
81
satisfaction rating of 88%.
 Partnerships between the James A. Haley Veterans’
Hospital and AFGE Local 547, the Florida Nurses Association
and the Tampa Professional Nurses Unit reduced delivery time
for critical medication from ninety-two minutes to twenty
minutes, cut turnaround time for x-ray reports from eight days to
one day, and reduced processing time for pension and
82
compensation exams from thirty-one days to eighteen days.


A National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)-Customs
Service partnership designed a seven-step strategy to increase
PERSONNEL MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/lmr/report/index.htm (last updated Jan. 12, 2000).
78. Id. § 1(2).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 2.
81. Id. § 3(1).
82. Id. § 3(2).
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seizures of illegal drugs. During the six month life of the joint
action plan, narcotics seizures increased by 42% and drug
83
currency seizures increased by 74%.
 Partnership between the Defense Distribution Depot in
San Joaquin and AFGE Local 1546 saved $950,000 per year by
reducing workplace accidents by 20% and ergonomic injuries by
40%, reduced overtime expenses from $9.8 million to $1.4
million and reduced production costs from $25.42 per unit to
84
$23.48 per unit.

Workplaces where employees are empowered and challenged to
take responsibility for the efficient operation of their agencies and the
craft, artistic, or professional aspects of their work are commonly
85
referred to as “high performance workplaces.” There is evidence from
the private sector that high performance workplaces are significantly
more efficient and productive workplaces than traditional workplaces
and that unionized high performance workplaces are even more
86
efficient and productive than their non-unionized counterparts.
Economists Sandra Black and Lisa Lynch simulated a base case of a
87
non-union manufacturer with little employee involvement. They found
that unionized firms with little employee involvement had productivity
88
levels 15% lower than the base case. Non-unionized firms with high
employee involvement had productivity levels 10.6% higher than the
89
base case. But “adding unionization to this already high-performance
workplace is associated with an impressive 20% increase in labor
90
productivity.” They then examined the actual mean characteristics of
91
unionized and nonunionized firms in a sample of manufacturers. They
found that the unionized firms averaged productivity 16% higher than

83. Id. § 3(3).
84. Id.
85. See Carol Gill, Union Impact on the Effective Adoption of High Performance Work
Practices, 19 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 39, 39 (2009) (referring to these practices as
“high performance work practices”).
86. See id. at 42–43.
87. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, The New Workplace: What Does It Mean for
Productivity?, in 1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING 60, 64 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1998).
88. Id. at 65.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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the base case while the nonunionized firms’ productivity averaged 11%
92
lower than the base case. Treating unions as partners and involving
them in administering employee participation programs results in
93
positive collective employee voice and product improvement. Unions
provide independent employee voice that plays a crucial role in
94
successfully developing and sustaining high performance workplaces.
In a report released in 1996, a task force of the Secretary of Labor
catalogued numerous examples where workers, operating through their
unions, partnered with public employers to increase efficiency and
95
improve public services.
I and others have related numerous
96
The many Wisconsin public officials who
additional examples.
opposed Act 10 expressed concern that enactment would impede the
labor-management cooperative efforts that had improved public
97
services throughout the state. But such a result is not inevitable. The
next section explores ways in which parties may be able to maintain
positive relationships and outcomes in spite of Act 10’s dismantling of
collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin.
IV. LIFE AFTER ACT 10
Achieving the types of labor-management partnerships that lead to
improved public services requires considerable risk-taking on the part of
managers and labor leaders. Managers must take the risk of sharing
decision-making responsibility with labor, even though the legal regime
gives management the right of unilateral control. Labor leaders must
92. Id.
93. See William N. Cooke, Product Quality Improvement Through Employee
Participation: The Effects of Unionization and Joint Union-Management Administration, 46
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 119, 132 (1992).
94. See Gill, supra note 85.
95. U.S. SEC’Y OF LABOR’S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN STATE & LOCAL GOV’T
THROUGH LABOR-MGMT. COOPERATION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE
(1996) [hereinafter WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE], available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/252/.
96. See
DAVID
LEWIN
ET
AL.,
GETTING
IT
RIGHT:
EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FROM RESEARCH ON PUBLIC-SECTOR
UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
16–22
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1792942; Stephen Goldsmith & Mark E.
Schneider, Partnering for Public Value: New Approaches in Public Employee LaborManagement Relations, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 415, 416–18 (2003); Martin H. Malin, The
Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1392–96 (2009) [hereinafter Malin,
Paradox]; Malin & Kerchner, supra note 67, at 903–11.
97. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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risk giving up the ability to criticize management’s unilateral decisions
and must be willing to share in the responsibility for decisions jointly
determined and the outcomes resulting from those decisions.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the legal regime governing public sector
collective bargaining most common in the United States channels
98
parties away from such risk taking. Taking these risks is easier where
the legal regime provides a strong system of labor and management
rights on which to fall back. As Clinton administration Office of
Personnel Management Director Janice Lachance observed,
“[P]artnership is the high wire and collective bargaining is the safety
99
net.”
Although Act 10 has dismantled the strong legal regime of labor and
management rights that existed in Wisconsin prior to 2011, it need not
take down the labor-management cooperative efforts that enhanced
100
public services in the state. Wisconsinites seeking examples of labormanagement cooperation despite hostile state law should look to
Norfolk, Virginia.
By statute, Virginia expressly prohibits all public employee
101
collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, the Norfolk Federation of
Teachers, an affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers,
represents teachers in the Norfolk Public School System and the parties
negotiate memoranda of understanding, even though such agreements
102
are not legally enforceable.
Working together, the union and the
school district, along with other elements of the Norfolk community
transformed the school system into a model urban school district which,
in 2005, received the Broad Prize for the top urban school district in the

98. See Malin, Paradox, supra note 96, at 1398–99.
99. OPM Director Lachance Addresses Future of Federal Workforce, 36 GOV’T EMP.
REL. REP. 418, 422 (1998) (quoting American Federation of Government Employees
President John Sturdivant).
100. One of the most effective partnerships begun under the Clinton Executive Order,
the partnership between the National Federation of Federal Employees and the U.S. Forest
Service continued throughout the Bush administration and continues today under the Obama
administration. William Dougan, Nat’l President, NFFE & Hank Kashden, former Assoc.
Chief, Forest Serv., Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Conference held in
connection with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission’s Annual Conference on
Wisconsin Public Sector Labor Relations (April 27, 2011).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1–57.2 (2002).
102. See Ann C. Hodges & William Warwick, The Sheathed Sword: Public-Sector Union
Efficacy in Non-Bargaining States, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 275, 285 (2012).
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103

country. As the Norfolk example illustrates, public employers can still
engage their workers effectively through their unions in spite of laws
similar to Act 10. This section now turns to strategies that may be
adapted from other jurisdictions.
A. Bargain Anyway
The system of collective bargaining codified for most private sector
workers in the National Labor Relations Act, and adapted to the public
sector in most public employee labor relations acts, confers on a labor
organization designated or selected by a majority of the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit the status of exclusive representative of all
104
employees in the unit.
All employees in the unit are bound by the
contract negotiated by the union and the employer may not bypass the
105
The duty to bargain,
union and deal directly with the employees.
however, attaches only to matters that are considered to be mandatory
106
subjects of bargaining.
Although Act 10 expressly designates all subjects other than
increases in base wages as prohibited subjects of bargaining, it adds no
new mechanism for enforcing the prohibition. This is not surprising,
107
considering that Act 10’s purpose is to empower management. Act 10,
however, could have empowered management by simply designating all
subjects other than increases in base wages as permissive subjects of
bargaining.
If a matter is a permissive subject of bargaining,
108
management may act unilaterally. Management has no obligation to
provide the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative information
109
relevant to the subject, and it may by-pass the exclusive representative
and deal directly with individual employees or its self-selected group of
103. Id. at 286. The Broad Prize for Urban Education “is awarded each year to honor
urban school districts that demonstrate the greatest overall performance and improvement in
student achievement while reducing achievement gaps among low-income and
minority students.” Overview, BROAD PRIZE FOR URB. EDUC., http://www.broadprize.org/a
bout/overview.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
105. See J. I. Case Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 321 U.S. 322, 334–35, 339 (1944).
106. See, e.g., City of Brookfield v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 87 Wis. 2d 819, 829,
275 N.W.2d 723, 728 (1979); Racine Educ. Ass’n v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 214 Wis.
2d 352, 359, 571 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Ct. App. 1997).
107. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
109. See, e.g., Vill. of Franklin Park v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 638 N.E.2d 1144,
1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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110

employees.
A party who insists on its position to the point of impasse with
respect to a permissive subject of bargaining commits an unfair labor
111
practice. The same rule applies to a prohibited subject of bargaining.
Thus, at least as far as the collective bargaining process is concerned,
legally, it makes no difference if a matter is designated as a prohibited
subject of bargaining or as a permissive subject of bargaining. The
critical difference between the two is that unlike a prohibited subject, a
permissive subject may, by agreement, be included in the collective
112
bargaining agreement and enforced.
Therefore, designating matters as prohibited, rather than permissive,
subjects of bargaining further empowers management by allowing it to
walk away from any agreements it reaches with respect to those
subjects. When a public employer agrees with an exclusive bargaining
representative concerning a matter on which it had no legal authority to
113
agree, the agreement is legally unenforceable.
Thus, Act 10’s
designation of all subjects other than increases in base wages as
prohibited subjects of bargaining renders agreements between an
employer and an exclusive bargaining representative unenforceable.
In states where collective bargaining is prohibited, negotiations
nevertheless occur and agreements are reached.
Although the
agreements are legally unenforceable, they are usually complied with
114
out of mutual respect and cooperation.
One of the most prominent examples of a public employer engaging
in collective bargaining and abiding by collective bargaining agreements
despite the absence of legal authority to do so is the City of Memphis,

110. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d
723, 728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
111. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,
349 (1958).
112. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1480 (John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 6th ed. 2012).
113. See, e.g., Cnty. of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n Local 1000, 869 N.E.2d 1,
4 (N.Y. 2007); In re City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n Local 854, 739 N.E.2d
719, 724 (N.Y. 2000). Even an agreement to arbitrate alleged violations of unilaterally
promulgated employer policy with respect to prohibited subjects of bargaining may be
unenforceable. See Chi. Teachers Union Local No. 1 Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. Ill. Educ.
Labor Relations Bd., 778 N.E.2d 1232, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (enforcing arbitration award
after finding that issue fell outside the scope of statutorily prohibited subjects of bargaining).
114. See Hodges & Warwick, supra note 102, at 285; Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the
Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 735, 748, 752 (2009).
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Tennessee. Although no statute expressly prohibits public employee
collective bargaining in Tennessee, the courts have held that—absent
express statutory authorization—units of local government lack
authority to engage in collective bargaining and enter into collective
115
bargaining agreements.
Nevertheless, Memphis has contracts with
116
thirteen unions covering twenty-four bargaining units.
Many of the Memphis contracts purport to be negotiated with the
union as exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in a
117
designated bargaining unit.
Most prominent among these are
memoranda of understanding between the City of Memphis and
AFSCME Local 1733. The Memphis-AFSCME collective bargaining
relationship dates to 1968 when Memphis sanitation workers struck for
118
recognition.
The principal AFSCME-Memphis memorandum of understanding
(MOU) covers a bargaining unit consisting of designated job
classifications in the “Public Works Division, Division of Public Services
and Neighborhoods, General Services Division, Engineering, Police
Services Division, Fire Services Division, Park Services and the
119
[municipal] Judicial System.” In the memorandum, the City expressly
recognizes the union “as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for
all employees” in the specified bargaining unit and provides that “no
other labor organization shall be recognized unless they are designated
115. See Local Union 760 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Harriman, No.
E2000-00367-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1801856, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2000); Weakley
Cnty. Mun. Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 309 S.W.2d 792, 804 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957). Prior to enactment
of the Virginia statute, the Virginia Supreme Court had held similarly. See Commonwealth v.
Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty., 232 S.E.2d 30, 44 (Va. 1977).
116. See Union MOU’s, CITY OF MEMPHIS, www.cityofmemphis.org/framework.aspx?p
age=1344 (last visited October 17, 2012) (listing and providing links to City of Memphis
memoranda of understanding with thirteen unions representing its employees).
117. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Solid Waste
Management, Public Works Division, Public Works Division, Public Service Division, Police
Services Division, Fires Services Division, Park Services, Engineering, Public Works Division,
Judicial System, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract],
available
at
www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Main.pdf;
Memorandum
of
Understanding Between City of Memphis and Communications Workers of America, Local
3806, art. 1 (Apr. 19, 2011) [hereinafter CWA-Memphis Contract], available at
http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/CWA.pdf.
118. See Earl Caldwell, Sanitation Strike in Memphis Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1968,
at 1. Martin Luther King Jr. was in Memphis supporting the striking workers when he was
assassinated. Id.
119. AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117, art. 1.
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by a majority of the non-supervisory employees of the appropriate
120
unit.” Identical exclusive recognition is provided to AFSCME Local
1733 in separate memoranda of understanding covering a secretarial and
121
general clerical bargaining unit; a bargaining unit within the Division
122
of Community Enhancement, Code Enforcement; a bargaining unit of
123
employees in the Police Property, Evidence, and Photo Lab; and a
bargaining unit of employees in the Engineering Division Survey
124
Service Center.
All of the AFSCME-Memphis memoranda purport to govern wages;
longevity pay; retirement; job classifications; discipline and discharge;
holidays; vacations; sick leave; employee assistance programs; leaves of
absence; time off due to a death in the employee’s immediate family;
hours of work, reporting, call-back, and standby pay; health and safety;
overtime; shift work; insurance; health care plans; training;
subcontracting; payroll deduction of union dues; and a no strike
125
agreement.
Although they are not legally enforceable, they provide

120. Id.
121. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Secretary B
and C, and General Clerk A and B, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis
Clerical Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Secretary_Ge
neral_Clerk.pdf.
122. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Housing and
Community Development Code Enforcement, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCMEMemphis Code Enforcement Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms
/MOU/HCD_Code.pdf.
123. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Police
Property & Evidence and Photo Lab, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis
Crime Lab Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Property_
Evidence_Photo_Lab.pdf.
124. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, Local 1733: Survey Service
Center, art. 1 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis Survey Service Contract],
available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Survey_Service_Center.pdf.
125. See AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117; AFSCME-Memphis
Clerical Contract, supra note 121; AFSCME-Memphis Code Enforcement Contract, supra
note 122; AFSCME-Memphis Crime Lab Contract, supra note 123; AFSCME-Memphis
Survey Service Contract, supra note 124. Governor Walker would regard such bargaining as
an impediment to innovation and reform, see Walker, supra note 64, but that does not appear
to be the case in Memphis. For example, AFSCME and the City of Memphis recently agreed
to replace its fleet of trash collection trucks which require two to three workers per truck with
modern automated trucks that require only one worker. See Editorial, AFSCME, City Find
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for enforcement through grievance procedures culminating in
126
arbitration. Although arbitration is final and binding with respect to
suspensions and discharge, on all other matters it is advisory to the
127
City.
Memphis Police radio dispatchers are represented by Local 3806 of
128
the Communication Workers of America (CWA). The memorandum
of understanding between the City and CWA covers topics comparable
to those covered in the AFSCME memoranda and also covers internal
investigation procedures, personnel file review, residency, secondary
employment, uniform allowances, career development, and tuition
129
reimbursement.
As with the AFSCME memoranda, the CWA
memorandum provides that the City recognizes the union “as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent for all permanent full-time Police Radio
130
Dispatchers.”
As with the AFSCME memoranda, the CWA
memorandum is enforceable through a grievance procedure culminating
in arbitration and arbitration is final and binding with respect to
suspensions and discharge but advisory with respect to all other
131
matters.
Local 369D of the International Union of Operating Engineers
132
(IUOE) represents City of Memphis employees in six bargaining units.
Common Ground, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 23, 2012, at 4A. The new trucks reportedly enhance
worker safety, provide a basis that may lead to the City bringing refuse collection that had
been contracted out back in-house and could save the City between $2 million and $4 million
per year. Id.
126. See AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117, art. 5; AFSCME-Memphis
Clerical Contract, supra note 121, art. 5; AFSCME-Memphis Code Enforcement Contract,
supra note 122, art. 5; AFSCME-Memphis Crime Lab Contract, supra note 123, art. 5;
AFSCME-Memphis Survey Service Contract, supra note 124, art. 5.
127. AFSCME-Memphis Main Contract, supra note 117, art. 6; AFSCME-Memphis
Clerical Contract, supra note 121, art. 6; AFSCME-Memphis Code Enforcement Contract,
supra note 122, art. 6; AFSCME-Memphis Crime Lab Contract, supra note 123, art. 6;
AFSCME-Memphis Survey Service Contract, supra note 124, art. 6.
128. CWA-Memphis Contract, supra note 117, art. 1.
129. Id. (see table of contents for a complete list of topics covered by this
memorandum).
130. Id.
131. Id. arts. 10–11.
132. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 369D: Animal Shelter (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter IUO
E-Memphis Animal Shelter Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/Animal_Shelter.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 369D: Construction Inspectors (Mar. 25, 2
011) [hereinafter IUOE-Memphis Construction Inspectors Contract], available at http://www.
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In memoranda of understanding in effect in five of those units, the City
recognizes the union as the “sole bargaining agent” for all regular, fulltime employees in the union and grants “exclusive recognition to the
133
Union.”
As with the AFSCME and CWA memoranda, the Animal
Shelter memorandum is enforced through a grievance and arbitration
procedure that culminates in arbitration that is final and binding with
respect to suspensions and discharges but advisory with respect to all
134
other matters. Under the other four IUOE memoranda, arbitration is
135
final and binding with respect to all matters.
In some other Memphis bargaining units, the memoranda of
understanding are not as explicit with respect to whether recognition of
the union is exclusive to the bargaining unit. Three memoranda of
understanding cover employees represented by the International
Association of Machinists. In each, the City recognizes the union “as
the designated representative” for employees in the defined bargaining
units and provides that “no other labor organization shall be recognized
unless they be recognized by a majority of the non-supervisory

cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/CONSTRUCTION_INSPECTORS.pdf; Memorandum
of Understanding Between City of Memphis and International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 369D: Dispatchers, Public Works Division, Engineering Division (Mar. 25,
2011) [hereinafter IUOE-Memphis Public Works Dispatchers Contract], available at
http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/DISPATCHERS.pdf;
Memorandum
of
Understanding Between City of Memphis and International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 369D: Stoppage Operator/Sewer Environment (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
IUOE-Memphis Stoppage Operators Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pd
f_forms/MOU/STOPPAGE_OPERATOR.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between
City of Memphis and International Union of Operating Engineers: Treatment Plants, Sewer
Stations, Flood Control Facilities, Pollution Control (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter IUOEMemphis Treatment Plants Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/TREATMENT_PLANTS.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of
Memphis and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 369: Heavy Equipment
Operators (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter IUOE-Memphis Heavy Equipment Operators
Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Heavy_Equipment_O
perators.pdf.
133. IUOE-Memphis Animal Shelter Contract, supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis
Construction Inspectors Contract, supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis Public Works
Dispatchers Contract, supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis Stoppage Operators Contract,
supra note 132, art. 2; IUOE-Memphis Treatment Plants Contract, supra note 132, art. 2.
134. IUOE-Memphis Animal Shelter Contract, supra note 132, art. 6.
135. IUOE-Memphis Construction Inspectors Contract, supra note 132, art. 6; IUOEMemphis Public Works Dispatchers Contract, supra note 132, art. 6; IUOE-Memphis
Stoppage Operators Contract, supra note 132, art. 6; IUOE-Memphis Treatment Plants
Contract, supra note 132, art. 6.
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136

personnel of the appropriate classification.”
Unlike the other
memoranda of understanding, the Machinists’ memoranda do not
expressly state that the union is the representative for all bargaining unit
employees and do not use the adjective “exclusive” to characterize the
recognition. As with most of the other bargaining units, the Machinists’
memoranda provide for enforcement through grievance procedures that
culminate in arbitration that is binding for suspension and discharge
137
cases but advisory as to all other matters.
An agreement with the
Memphis Police Association recognizes that union as “designated
bargaining representative” for police officers below the rank of
138
lieutenant.
The agreement does not use the words “all” to modify
employees or “exclusive” to modify representative and does not contain
language found in the Machinists’ memoranda precluding the City from
recognizing another labor organization. It is unclear whether the
Memphis recognition of the Police Association is exclusive or limited to
its members. Interestingly, the police agreement provides for binding
139
arbitration over all matters.
As developed in the next section,
Memphis also has several bargaining units in which it has recognized
unions as representatives of their members only.
Prior to 2011, public school teachers in Tennessee had statutory
rights to organize and bargain collectively under the Education

136. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis, Division of Fire
Services and Desoto Lodge No. 3 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers AFL-CIO, art. 2 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter IAMAW-Memphis Fire Services
Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Fire_Services.pdf;
Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis, Division of Police Services and
Desoto Lodge No. 3 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AFLCIO, art. 2 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter IAMAW-Memphis Police Services
Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Police_Services.pdf;
Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis, Division of General Services and
Desoto Lodge No. 3 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers AFLCIO, art. 2 (May 17, 2011) [hereinafter IAMAW-Memphis General Services Contract],
available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/General_Services.pdf.
137. IAMAW-Memphis Fire Services Contract, supra note 136, art. 7; IAMAWMemphis Police Services Contract, supra note 136, art. 7; IAMAW-Memphis General
Services Contract, supra note 136, art. 7.
138. Agreement Between Memphis Police Association and the City of Memphis, art. 2
(Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/MPA.pdf.
139. Id. art. 12. Article 12 of this Agreement suggests that the agreement covers all
bargaining unit members, not just members of the Police Association, because it expressly
provides for non-members to process their own grievances individually and that the
association is not responsible for non-members’ arbitration costs. Id.
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140

Professional Negotiations Act.
Other public school employees,
however, lacked any statutory right to bargain collectively. Despite the
absence of express statutory authority the Board of Education of the
Memphis Public Schools has recognized AFSCME as exclusive
representative for two bargaining units: one consisting of administrative
141
and clerical employees,
and another consisting of custodial,
142
Both
warehouse, cafeteria and nutrition service center employees.
provide for enforcement through grievance procedures culminating in
143
arbitration.
The clerical employees’ memorandum provides that the
arbitrator’s decision is binding unless the parties determine that it
usurps the Board of Education’s authority under the laws of
144
Tennessee, while in the other unit the determination of whether the
145
arbitrator’s decision usurps Board authority is left to the Board.
Some ambiguity exists in the recognition the Memphis City Schools
has accorded Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 205
in a bargaining unit of building engineers, nutritional services managers,
146
and driver education operations managers.
Their memorandum of
understanding merely “recognizes the Union as the bargaining
representative” without describing the recognition as “exclusive” and
using the word “certain” rather than “all” in describing the employees in
140. See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378 (repealing the Education Professional Negotiations
Act); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601 (2009) (the former “Education Professional
Negotiations Act”).
141. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Local
1733 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, art.
3 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter AFSCME-Memphis Office Professionals Clerical Unit
Contract], available at http://www.mcsk12.net/forms/AFSCME%20Local%201733%20_Cleric
al_%20Contract%20%202009%20-%202012.pdf.
142. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Local
1733 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, art.
3 (Nov. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Memphis City Schools-AFSCME Blue Collar Contract],
available at http://www.mcsk12.net/HR/docs/AFSCME%20Local%201733%20Contract%202
010-2013.pdf.
143. See AFSCME-Memphis Office of Professionals Clerical Unit Contract, supra note
141, art. 8; Memphis City Schools-AFSCME Blue Collar Contract, supra note 142, art. 7.
144. AFSCME-Memphis Office of Professionals Clerical Unit Contract, supra note 141,
art. 8.
145. Memphis City Schools-AFSCME Blue Collar Contract, supra note 142, art. 7.
146. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Memphis City Schools and Service
Employees International Union, Local 205: Building Engineers and Nutrition Services
Managers Unit (August 2010), available at http://www.mcsk12.net/eagenda/Board%20Work
%20Session-August%209,%202010%20on%20Monday,%20August%2009,%202010/BEC05
D46-730E-472F-9CF5-5624446350F1.pdf.
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147

the bargaining unit.
The recognition appears to be exclusive, as the
memorandum provides that only the union may process grievances
beyond the second step of the grievance procedure and only the union
148
may take grievances to arbitration.
As with one of the AFSCME
memoranda, the SEIU memorandum provides for enforcement through
a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration, but also provides that
the arbitrator’s award is not binding if the Board of Education
149
determines that it usurps Board authority.
The Memphis City Schools have recognized the UAW and a
coalition of craft unions using virtually identical cautious language:
“While affirming its legally constituted authority to take independent
action on matters pertaining to wages, hours, and working conditions,
the Board hereby recognizes the Union as the (certified) representative
150
of certain employees” in the designated bargaining unit.
Both
memoranda of understanding provide for grievance procedures
culminating in advisory arbitration, but the arbitrator’s decision is
151
effective unless the Board of Education affirmatively rejects it.
Thus, despite the absence of express statutory authority to do so,
and clear case law that holds that doing so in the absence of statutory
authority is ultra vires, the City of Memphis and the Memphis City
Schools have for quite some time engaged in traditional collective
bargaining with a number of different unions representing their
employees.
The memoranda of understanding all provide for
enforcement through grievance and arbitration procedures but they
differ on the extent to which the arbitrator’s decision is final and
binding. Those differences, to a certain extent, are irrelevant. Because
the memoranda of understanding are not legally enforceable, no

147. Id. art. 6.
148. Id. art. 9.
149. Id.
150. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Local
3036 and United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers on America
UAW, art. 1 (effective Jan. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Memphis-UAW Contract],
available at http://www.mcsk12.net/HR/forms/uaw%20contract%202009%20-%202013.pdf;
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Memphis City Schools and Memphis Board
of Education Craft Employees Association AFL-CIO, art. 3 (effective Jan. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter Craft Employees Association Contract], available at http://www.mcsk12.net/form
s/CRAFT%20Contract%20%202007%20-%202010.pdf. The latter memorandum omits the
word “certified.” Id.
151. Memphis-UAW Contract, supra note 150, art. 7; Craft Employees Association
Contract, supra note 150, art. 7.
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arbitrator’s decision is truly final and binding despite what the
agreement provides because the employer may always walk away from
it with legal impunity. Enforcement depends on continued positive
relationships between the parties.
What lessons might the Tennessee examples offer Wisconsin? Act
10 gutted collective bargaining rights in two different ways. For one
group of workers, Act 10 exempted them from the state’s employment
152
relations acts.
Although for these employees there is no statutory
right to organize and bargain collectively, there is also no statutory
prohibition. There would appear to be no legal impediment to the
employer voluntarily recognizing a union designated or selected by a
majority of employees in one of these groups. All of these workers,
however, are employed by the State of Wisconsin. As long as the
Governor is hostile to collective bargaining, voluntary recognition will
not occur. However, a future Governor more receptive to public
employee voice could voluntarily recognize employees’ representatives.
Tennessee authority suggests that such recognition may only be lawful
where authorized by statute, but the weight of authority from other
153
jurisdictions is to the contrary. There is a rich history of the extension
of collective bargaining rights in the absence of statute by gubernatorial
154
executive order.
The majority of public employees under Act 10 nominally remain
covered by the state’s public sector collective bargaining statutes, but
155
bargaining on all subjects other than base wages is prohibited.
Because an employer may legally walk away from any contract
provision other than base wages, public employers would appear to have
minimal legal risk in bargaining with the employees’ exclusive
156
representative despite the statute. The principal risk Wisconsin public
employers would face would be political. Opponents of public
152. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. and Mun. Emps. v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874
(8th Cir. 2008) (applying Arkansas law); City of Phx. v. Phx. Emp’t Relations Bd., 699 P.2d
1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Littleton Educ. Ass’n v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 553 P.2d 793
(Colo. 1976); Chi. Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 222 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966);
La. Teachers Ass’n v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 303 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
154. See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 288–89 (2d ed. 2011).
155. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 245, 314.
156. Perhaps the principal legal risk would be that an employee covered by the contract
who is opposed to representation may file an unfair labor practice charge with the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.
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employee collective bargaining could be expected to generate
considerable political heat for public officials who opt to negotiate
prohibited subjects. Act 10 was extremely polarizing politically and the
polarization remains. In such a political environment, it is probably
unrealistic to expect public employers to negotiate prohibited subjects
of bargaining even though they may walk away from any agreements
reached at any time.
B. Members Only Bargaining
Although Act 10 prohibits collective bargaining with a union serving
157
as exclusive representative over anything other than base wages, it
does not prohibit negotiations between public employers and individual
employees. Nor would it seem to prohibit negotiations between public
employers and two or more employees. Before the Major League
Baseball Players Association gained the right to collectively bargain for
major league baseball players, Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale, the two
aces of the Los Angeles Dodgers’ pitching staff, held out together and
158
were able to negotiate better deals than they could have individually.
Koufax and Drysdale apparently were advised by the same attorney
159
during their holdout. Public employers reluctant to negotiate with an
exclusive representative on behalf of an entire bargaining unit over
prohibited subjects of bargaining may be more amenable to negotiating
with a union serving as a common agent for the union’s members.
The City of Memphis has several members-only collective
bargaining relationships. Although most of the City’s memoranda of
understanding with IUOE Local 369D recognize the union as exclusive
representative for bargaining unit employees, the memorandum with
Local 369D covering heavy equipment operators recognizes the union
“as the collective bargaining agency of its present members and those
160
becoming such in the future individually and collectively.”
The
agreement is enforced through a grievance procedure culminating in
161
final and binding arbitration.

157. See 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 245, 314.
158. See Associated Press, Holdout Twins Look Like Money in the Bank in Drills, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1966, at S1.
159. Bill Becker, Koufax and Drysdale Agree to One-Year Contracts Totaling Over
$210,000, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1966, at 47.
160. IUOE-Memphis Heavy Equipment Operators Contract, supra note 132, art. 1.
161. Id. art. 11.
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The memorandum of understanding covering Memphis firefighters
also appears to be a members-only contract. The memorandum accords
the union recognition “as a designated representative for certain
employees of the Division of Fire” and adds that “[t]he term ‘certain
employees’ . . . places no limitations or restrictions on the right of an
162
employee to belong to and be represented by the Union.” As with the
IUOE memorandum, enforcement is through a grievance procedure
163
culminating in binding arbitration. Similar recognition provisions are
found in memoranda of understanding between the City and various
164
building trades unions. Enforcement is through a grievance procedure
which culminates in arbitration that, like the AFSCME memoranda, is
final and binding only with respect to suspensions and discharge and is
165
advisory with respect to all other matters.
A strong argument can be made that an agreement negotiated by a
union on behalf of its members only, rather than as exclusive
162. Agreement Between City of Memphis and the International Association of Fire
Fighters Local 1784, art. 1 (Sept. 22, 2011), available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_for
ms/MOU/IAFF.pdf.
163. Id. art. 8.
164. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 474, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter MemphisElectrical Workers Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/IB
EW.pdf.; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the IUPAT,
Painters Union Local 49, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis-IUPAT Contract],
available at http://www.memphistn.gov/pdf_forms/MOU/Painters_Union.pdf; Memorandum
of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the Plumbers Union Local 17, art. 1 (Mar.
25, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis-Plumbers Union Contract], available at http://www.memphist
n.gov/pdf_forms/MOU/Plumbers_Union.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between
City of Memphis and the Roofers Union Local 115, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [MemphisRoofers Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MOU/Roofer
s_Union.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis and the
Cement Masons Union Local 908, art. 1 (effective July 1, 2011) [hereinafter MemphisCement Masons Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/MO
U/Cement_Masons_Union.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis
and the Carpenters Union Local 345, art. 1 (effective July 1, 2011) [hereinafter
Memphis-Carpenters Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/Carpenters_Union.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Memphis
and the Bricklayers Union Local 5, art. 1 (Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Memphis-Bricklayers Union Contract], available at http://www.cityofmemphis.org/pdf_forms/
MOU/Bricklayers_Union.pdf.
165. Memphis-Electrical Workers Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-IUPAT
Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-Plumbers Union Contract, supra note 164, art. 18;
Memphis-Roofers Union Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-Cement Masons Union
Contract, supra note 164, art. 18; Memphis-Carpenters Union Contract, supra 164, art. 18;
Memphis-Bricklayer’s Union Contract, supra note 164, art. 18.
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representative for all employees in a bargaining unit, would be
enforceable. The argument would be even stronger if the agreement is
implemented with a series of identical individual contracts with each
166
member employee.
Members-only negotiations might also shield
public officials from some of the political risk they would run if they
negotiate with a union as exclusive bargaining representative with
respect to prohibited subjects of bargaining.
C. Negotiated Frameworks for Union Representation
Under the First Amendment, public employees’ freedom of speech
167
and association protects their right to form and join labor unions.
That is where First Amendment protection for public employees’ union
organizing activity starts and ends.
Employees have no First
Amendment right to union representation, even as individuals resorting
to their employers’ unilaterally promulgated internal grievance
168
procedure.
Perhaps recognizing the limitations of constitutional law as a source
of representational rights, SEIU Local 205 has negotiated memoranda
of understanding with local governmental authorities in Nashville and
Davidson County that provide what I will call a framework for union
169
representation of employees.
For example, the memorandum of
understanding between Local 205 and the Government of Metropolitan
Nashville provides for recognition of the union as the “exclusive
authorized Representative . . . of all Civil Service General Government
employees,” but further declares that “the purpose of this MOU is to
allow the UNION to represent all employees who desire to be

166. The case for the legality of members-only contracts is not an open-and-shut one.
Because Wisconsin law prohibits employers from discriminating to encourage membership in
a labor organization, employers may feel compelled to extend the terms of members-only
contracts unilaterally to other employees in the bargaining unit. This may fuel an argument
that the claim that members-only bargaining is consistent with Act 10’s prohibitions elevates
form over substance.
167. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137,
139 (8th Cir. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
168. See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979).
169. See generally Memorandum of Understanding Between Tennessee Healthcare and
Public Service Workers Union, Service Employees International Union, Local 205 and
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (effective July 1, 2012)
[hereinafter SEIU-Nashville Contract], available at http://www.seiu205.org/admin/Assets/Ass
etContent/ea195743-16b7-4754-a0be-31445ef2a83d/546bfa9e-94e2-495f-9d30-54cc81f55e47/7c
eaa87d-463f-4c94-9ab2-34f4f2fbde15/1/Metro_MOU_-_2012-2014.pdf.
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represented in the above-described represented unit.”
The
memorandum does not establish substantive terms and conditions of
171
employment. It adopts by reference the Nashville Civil Service Rules
172
and Pay Plan. Employees have a right to be represented by the union
in Civil Service proceedings provided that they authorize such
173
representation in writing.
The memorandum essentially establishes
the infrastructure for such representation by providing for the
recognition of stewards, release time for employees performing
representational functions, union access to employer facilities and
bulletin boards, voluntary payment of union dues by payroll deduction,
and a right to meet and confer regarding changes in employer policies
174
with respect to terms and conditions of employment and the pay plan.
The model is followed in memoranda of understanding that Local 205
has with the Metropolitan Action Commission of Nashville and
Davidson County, the Hospital Authority of the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan
175
Housing and Development Authority.
These memoranda provide a
model that public employers and unions in Wisconsin may adopt to
facilitate union representation of employees who desire it. They may
ensure that employees who are union members may be represented by
their unions in investigatory interviews and in employer internal
grievance and civil service proceedings. They may also provide for
union access to employees at the workplace for purposes of
representation and union access to information relevant to member
representation.

170. Id. art. 1.
171. See SEIU-Nashville Contract, supra note 169.
172. Id. arts. 8–10, 14.
173. Id. art. 8.
174. See id. arts. 4–6, 11, 13, 16.
175. Proposed Memorandum of Understanding Between Service Employees
International Union and Metropolitan Action Commission of Nashville and Davidson
County (Nov. 2, 2011); Memorandum of Understanding Between Tennessee Healthcare and
Public Service Workers Union, Service Employees International Union, Local 205 and the
Hospital Authority of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
(effective July 1, 2008–June 30, 2011) [hereinafter SEIU-Nashville Hospital Contract];
Memorandum of Understanding Between Tennessee Healthcare and Public Service Workers
Union, Service Employees International Union, Local 205 and Metropolitan Development
and Housing Agency (effective Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter SEIU-MDHA Contract], available
at http://seiu205.org/Assets/AssetContent//ea195743-16b7-4754-a0be-31445ef2a83d/546bfa9e94e2-495f-9d30-54cc81f55e47/e1916551-173b-40dc-a0c6-1b98da71f551/1/MDHA.pdf.
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D. Meet and Confer and Consultation
Employers looking for a structure to ensure positive employee input
in workplace decision-making after Act 10 have looked to provide for
meet and confer sessions with employees’ unions. For example,
Milwaukee requires its Department of Employee Relations to “[m]eet
and confer with employees and employee groups, including currently
and previously-certified employee groups, for the purpose of
communicating, soliciting and exchanging information, views, ideas and
interests concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of
176
employment.” Established examples exist of what a meet and confer
or consultation system might look like.
Minnesota requires its public employers to meet and confer with
representatives of their professional employees with respect to matters
relating to public services that are not mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Such meet and confer sessions must take place at least once every four
177
months.
The statute defines meet and confer as “the exchange of
178
views and concerns between employers and their employees.”
Greater structure for such employee input in employer decisionmaking is found in the Federal Service Labor Management Relations
Statute. The statute provides that in agencies where no union has
exclusive recognition on an agency-wide basis, unions that are exclusive
representatives of a substantial number of agency employees are
179
entitled to national consultation rights.
National consultation rights
include rights to be informed of any proposed substantive changes in
conditions of employment, to be permitted reasonable time to present
views and recommendations, to have views considered before the
agency takes final action, and to receive a written statement of reasons
180
for the final action.
For meet and confer to be more than mere window dressing, several
elements should be present. Most importantly, there should be notice to
the employees’ representative and an opportunity for involvement
before a decision is made. There should also be a sharing of relevant
information concerning the matters under discussion. Employers should
176. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 340-3(2)(a) (2011), available at
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/ccClerk/Ordinances/Volume-3/CH340.pdf.
177. MINN. STAT. ANN § 179A.08(2) (2006).
178. Id. § 179A.03–(10).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 7113(a) (2006).
180. Id. § 7113(b).
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consider the union’s representations in good faith and should respond to
them by, at a minimum, indicating how those representations were
considered and, if they were rejected, the reasons for the rejection.
E. Collaborative Conferencing
In 2011, Tennessee repealed its statute which granted teachers
collective bargaining rights and replaced it with the Professional
181
Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act.
The Act provides an
intriguing model for employers and employees seeking to provide for
employee representation in a system that operates outside the confines
of Act 10. The Act replaces exclusive representation with proportional
representation, with each representation option that receives at least
182
15% of the vote getting a seat at the table.
The collaborative
conferencing committee remains in effect for three years after which the
183
election process is repeated.
The Act defines collaborative conferencing as “the process by which
[the parties] . . . meet at reasonable times to confer, consult and discuss
and to exchange information, opinions and proposals on matters relating
to the terms and conditions of professional employee service, using the
principles and techniques of interest-based collaborative problem184
solving.”
Because collaborative conferencing is not collective
bargaining, Act 10’s prohibition on bargaining should not apply. But,
Wisconsin parties attracted to this approach should not copy the
Tennessee statute wholesale. The Tennessee act contains provisions
that are likely to poison, rather than facilitate, a positive and
collaborative atmosphere. These include a provision authorizing the
director of schools to bypass the employees’ representatives and deal
185
directly with individual employees,
and a provision prohibiting
conferences with respect to a lengthy lists of subjects including
differential pay plans and incentive compensation, expenditure of grants
or awards, evaluations, staffing decisions, personnel decisions
concerning assignment of professional employees, and payroll
186
deductions for political activities.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-605(b)(4) (Supp. 2012).
Id. § 49-5-605(b)(6)(A).
Id. § 49-5-602(2).
Id. § 49-5-608(c).
Id. § 49-5-608(b).

12 MALIN (DO NOT DELETE)

656

3/6/2013 9:30 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:623

F. Union Financial Viability
None of the alternatives to Act 10 for vehicles for collective worker
voice will be effective if the workers’ representative is not financially
viable. As discussed previously, Act 10 dealt a potentially devastating
blow to union financial viability by prohibiting voluntary payment of
187
dues by payroll deduction. The U.S. District Court decision holding
the prohibition unconstitutional removes an enormous roadblock to
188
union financial viability. But, even if the Seventh Circuit affirms the
decision, the litigation will only remove the prohibition of employer
deduction of dues from employees’ paychecks. Employers must still
189
agree to make such deductions.
Wisconsin employers, once freed from Act 10’s prohibition, have
every reason to agree to allow employees to voluntarily authorize
payroll deductions to pay their union dues. Financially-viable unions
are critical to constructive independent collective employee voice in
workplace decision-making, and employee voice contributes to
improvements in public services. Indeed, every memorandum of
understanding in Tennessee examined for this Article expressly
provides for employees to pay their union dues by payroll deduction.
But dues check-off goes only so far in ensuring union financial
viability. Under Act 10, Wisconsin, except for public safety employees,
is now an open shop and it is likely that many employees will opt to
avoid the cost of union dues altogether. Models exist, however, for
ameliorating the effects of such free riding.
The federal government is also an open shop. The Federal Service
Labor Management Relations Statute affords union representatives a
right to use “official time” when engaged in collective bargaining

187. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text.
189. In the federal litigation, the unions have argued that the State of Wisconsin is
required to reinstitute dues check-off for all state employees who authorize it. See Reply
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council
v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856 (W.D. Wis. 2012). The unions argue that pre-Act 10 state law
provided for dues check-off for all employee organizations regardless of whether they were
exclusive bargaining representatives. See id. at 17; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (holding limitation on participation in the Combined
Federal Campaign to not-for-profit organizations that provide direct health and welfare
services to needy persons is facially valid but allowing excluded legal defense funds an
opportunity on remand to establish that their exclusions were based on the viewpoints they
advocate).
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190

negotiations. In other words, such union representatives have a right
to be released from their regular duties but continue in paid status when
engaged in collective bargaining. Unions and agencies frequently agree
in collective bargaining to supplement the statutory entitlement with
additional official time for the performance of other representational
191
duties.
Similarly, the SEIU memoranda of understanding with
governmental authorities in Nashville provide for blocks of paid release
192
time for employees performing representational functions.
Every
memorandum of understanding in Tennessee examined for this Article
provides for union representatives to be released from their regular
duties to investigate and present grievances without loss of pay.
Similarly, Wisconsin public employers should consider allowing union
representatives to perform some representational functions “on the
clock.”
V. A SILVER LINING IN THE GRAY CLOUD OF ACT 10
As far back as 1989, a Labor Department report identified legal
doctrine concerning the scope of bargaining as a barrier to labor193
management cooperation in the public sector.
Seven years later, a
Secretary of Labor task force elaborated on how disputes over the scope
of bargaining inhibit constructive labor-management efforts to improve
public services:
Because it affects the capacity of an agency or jurisdiction to
improve service, the clearest need is for workers, managers, and
union leaders to be able to discuss the full range of issues
affecting the service they are working to improve. In a
traditional labor-management relationship characterized by
formal or legalistic approaches, such discussion often is
precluded by concerns over setting precedents that might lead to
194
giving up prerogatives.

190. 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (2006).
191. See generally id. § 7131(d); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 90–91 (1983).
192. See SEIU-Nashville Contract, supra note 169, art. 11; SEIU-Nashville Hospitals
Contract, supra note 175, art. 17; SEIU-MDHA Contract, supra note 175, art. 21.
193. Robert B. Moberly, Legal Impediments to Labor-Management Cooperation in State
and Local Government, in U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION: FINAL REPORT 1, 19–22 (1989).
194. WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 95, at 65.
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Act 10 preempted such fights in Wisconsin by declaring everything
195
other than base wages to be prohibited subjects of bargaining. Act 10
thus forces employers and employee representatives to work outside the
established legal structure to devise mechanisms for independent
positive collective employee voice. This Article has provided a range of
alternatives for Wisconsin public employers and unions to consider.
Each of these models depends on positive relationships between
workers’ unions and their employers. However, the opposition of many
196
public employers to Act 10
indicates that many such positive
relationships already exist.
Further indication of such positive
relationships can be found in the numerous employers who agreed to
new collective bargaining agreements or to extend existing contracts
before Act 10 took effect to delay the application of Act 10 to their
197
workplaces.
For Wisconsin public employers to retain the benefits of
independent collective employee voice, they and their workers’ unions
have to work outside the existing legal structures. Such a move outside
the post-Act 10 legal framework can be liberating. As Professor Hodges
has observed, when parties move outside a legal structure that focuses
on whether a matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining, resulting
198
agreements “can be virtually unlimited in their scope.” The challenge
for Wisconsin public employers and unions is to devise their own models
for effective independent worker voice and demonstrate that Governor
Walker is wrong—that labor-management collaboration is a superior
method to unilateral command and control for providing effective and
efficient public services.

195.
196.
197.
198.

See 2011 Wis. Act 10 § 245.
See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
Editorial, A Triple Play on Local Taxpayers, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 27, 2012, at A13.
Hodges & Warwick, supra note 102, at 285.

